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TAX PROBLEMS OF SUCCESSIVE ESTATES
deduction of 8,000 dollars.5 Furthermore, since this contribution is one
of appreciated property, it would appear that all of the rules applicable
to such contributions must be considered."
An overall view of the provisions of the 1969 Act relating to charita-
ble deductions seems to indicate that the new law will have little eco-
nomic effect on the individual taxpayer. It is doubtful that the increase
in the maximum limitation will be a greater incentive for charitable con-
tributions since very few individuals contribute the maximum deductible
amount to charity each year. Furthermore, because of the five-year carry-
over provisions, which also applied under the old law, most taxpayers
could deduct the entire amount of their charitable contributions anyway.
While the new provisions eliminate most of the tax advantages previ-
ously available for taxpayers making charitable contributions of "ordinary
income property," many of the double tax savings, still remain for gifts
of "capital gain property." Thus, even though many of the rules gov-
erning charitable deductions have been tightened, the individual tax-
payer, by carefully following the new rules discussed in this note, can still
enjoy significant tax benefits through the use of charitable contributions.
TURNER VANN ADAMS
Income Tax-Problems of a Corporate Executor in the Administration
of Successive Estates
The gain or loss from the sale or exchange of property is determined,
for tax purposes, by the relation of the "amount realized" to the adjusted
basis of the property.' The method used to compute the basis for the
capital gains of property acquired from a decedent is defined by section
1014 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to be ."the fair market value
of the property at the date of the decedent's death ... ."2 In Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co. v. United States' the United States Court of Claims
applied section 1014 in a case involving successive deaths.
The plaintiff, a corporate executor, brought an action for refund of
federal income taxes paid by the estate. The plaintiff was the executor of
54Id.
P.H. 1970 FED. TAxEs 115 (Rep. Bull. 1, 1970).
'INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1001.
'Id. §1014(a).
-410 F.2d 767 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
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the estate of a woman who had died testate in 1957 and who had left
her husband as her sole residuary legatee. Her estate included securities
having at her death a fair market value of approximately 65,000 dollars.
The executor had not distributed the estate prior to the husband's death
in 1964, and at his death the fair market value of these securities was
almost 160,000 dollars. The plaintiff was also appointed executor of the
husband's estate. Shortly after the death of the husband, the executor
sold the securities for 160,700 dollars and with that money purchased
United States Treasury notes. In July, 1965, the executor sold the notes
and distributed the proceeds to the beneficiaries of the husband's estate.
As executor of the wife's estate, the plaintiff filed a fiduciary tax return
for the year 1964 reporting that the wife's estate had realized a long-
term capital gain from the sale of the securities. This gain was based on
the difference between the sale price in 1964 and the fair market value
of the securities at the wife's death in 1957, which resulted in a taxable
capital gain of almost 95,000 dollars. In December, 1964, the plaintiff
filed an amended tax return for the wife's estate claiming that, instead
of the long-term capital gain, the estate had realized only a short-term
capital gain representing the difference between the sale price in 1964
and the fair market value of the securities at the husband's death in 1964:
a gain of approximately one thousand dollars. The plaintiff's claim for
refund was disallowed and his suit followed.
The Court of Claims granted the government's motion for summary
judgment." The majority reasoned as follows: the plaintiff was acting sole-
ly in the capacity as executor of the wife's estate when he sold the securities
in 1964 even though his action was taken after the husband's death. Each
estate was a separate entity for tax purposes, and no merger of the two
estates was accomplished although the plaintiff was acting at the time
as executor of both estates. Since the plaintiff failed to show anything
in New York law requiring a different result, the wife's estate had realized
a long-term taxable capital gain on the difference between the sale price
and the fair market value at the wife's death.'
The dissent relied on Brewster v. Gage,6 a decision by the Supreme
Court in 1930. The plaintiff in Brewster was one of the residuary legatees
of the estate of his father, who had died in 1918. The father's stocks, the
personal property in question, had been distributed in 1920, and the plain-
"Id. at 770.
Id. at 768-70.
6280 U.S. 327 (1930).
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tiff had sold some of them in 1920, 1921, and 1922. The Commissioner
of Internal Revenue contended that the values of the stocks at the testator's
death, rather than at the date of distribution, should have been used to
determine capital gains and assessed a deficiency.7 The district court
agreed with the plaintiff's contention that the proper time for determining
basis for gains was the date of distribution,' but the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed' and held that the date of death was de-
terminative. The Supreme Court affirmed this judgment.10
The Supreme Court in Brewster relied on basic principles of property
law in reaching its decision. Under one of these principles, title to devised
real property, both legal and equitable, passes immediately to the devisee;
but the legal title to bequeathed personal property passes to the executor.
The Court stated that "immediately upon the death of the owner there
vests in each of [the legatees] the right to his distributive share of so
much as shall remain after proper administration"" and that "there vests
in the . . . executors, as of the date of the death, title to all personal
property belonging to the estate; it is taken, not for themselves, but in
the right of others ...."1 The Court emphasized the significance of the
date of death of the testator and relegated the date of distribution to
secondary importance: "[T]he decree of distribution confers no new
right; it merely identifies the property remaining, evidences right of
possession in the heirs or legatees and requires the administrators or
executors to deliver it to them. The legal title so given relates back to the
date of death."'" The Court concluded that at the testator's death the
legatee received an economic interest in the property even though the
executor held the legal title and that from the date of death the legatee
would be enriched or suffer loss with every increase or decline in the
value of the property.' 4
The dissenting judge applied these principles to the facts before the
court in Manufacturers Hanover Trust and reached a result favorable
to the taxpayer. His position was based on the rationale that the basis
used in the determination of capital gains should relate to the beneficial
7 Id. at 333.' Brewster v. Gage, 25 F.2d 915 (W.D.N.Y. 1927).
SBrewster v. Gage, 30 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1929).
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interest in the property. Since at the wife's death the husband acquired a
beneficial interest in the property, his basis should have been the fair market
value at that date. At the husband's death his legatees (the children)
received a stepped-up basis: the fair market value of the property at his
death rather than its lesser value at the time that he acquired it. The
sale by the executor could only be made for the legatees, the beneficial
owners. By focusing on the beneficial interest, the dissenting judge con-
cluded that the only gain realized was the difference between the sale
price and the fair market value of the securities on the date of the hus-
band's death. 5
Section 1014(b) (1) of the Code, which provides that a decedent's
estate shall be considered to have acquired property from the decedent for
the purpose of applying the general rule'6 for determining basis, does not
require a result different from the position taken by the dissent. The
estate is a taxable entity, and specific provisions in the Code provide for
the taxation of capital gains realized by it.17 Section 1014(b) (1) allows
the estate a stepped-up basis at the death of the decedent. This provision
does not preclude the courts from looking at the beneficial interest to
compute the basis for capital gains; Brewster, in fact, held that they must.
Moreover, courts have focused on the holder of the equitable title in
other areas of tax law. An example can be found in the determination
of what constitutes a depreciable interest. The basis used to determine
depreciation is the same as the basis used in computing capital gains.' 8
A case in which the depreciable-interest concept is illustrated is Helvering
v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co.' In that case a bank held the legal title to
three buildings used by the taxpayer in his business. The Commissioner
disallowed a depreciation deduction on the ground that the deduction
followed the legal title. The Supreme Court ruled against the Com-
missioner. It concluded that since the instrument conveying legal title to
the bank was merely a security agreement, the taxpayer, being the equitable
owner, should be allowed the depreciation deduction. The Court in
Lazarus emphasized the "equitable nature of [tax] proceedings" and the
concern of tax courts with "substance and realties" rather than formal
410 F.2d at 770-73 (dissenting opinion).
' INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1014(a).
1 Id. §§ 641(b), 1202. The majority relied on the separate-entity theory in
Manufacturers Hanover Trust. 410 F.2d at 770.13Id. § 167(g).
10308 U.S. 252 (1939).
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documents.20 In defining depreciable interest, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit has said:
It is not the physical property itself, nor the title thereto, which
alone entitles the owner to claim depreciation. The statutory allowance
is available to him whose interest in the wasting asset is such that he
would suffer an economic loss resulting from the deterioration and
physical exhaustion .... 21
Clearly equitable ownership was critical in the court's determination of
the depreciable interest.
The rationale of the dissent would be equally applicable in determining
capital losses and would produce a result different from that which would
be reached by using the rationale of the majority. If the securities in
Manufacturers Hanover Trust had decreased in value between the wife's
and the husband's death and then had further declined after the death of
the husband, the basis used in determining the loss would, under the view
of the dissent, still be the fair market value on the date of the husband's
death. In a declining market, the difference between the two computations
would be significant if the property was, as in Manufacturers Hanover
Trust, held over a long period and then sold immediately after the second
death.
The validity of the dissent's rationale can be illustrated by posing a
situation in which there are multiple legatees. If, in the principal case,
the husband had shared the securities with his two children, his portion
that was sold by the executor after his death would have received the
stepped-up basis while the basis of the children's shares would have re-
mained the fair market value at the time of their mother's death. This
difference would have occurred even if the securities had at all times been
treated as an entity by the executor, had been acquired from the same
decedent, and had been sold simultaneously.
The most serious objection to the view of the majority is that its focus
is primarily on the date of distribution and on the status of the plaintiff as
executor of the wife's estate on the date of sale. If the securities had been
distributed to the husband and had not been sold or exchanged prior
to his death, his estate and his legatees would have received a stepped-up
basis at his death. If the securities had been distributed to his estate
after his death but before sale, an identical result would have followed.
20 Id. ;t 255.
" Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. '1953).
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The only difference between the latter situations and the actual facts
of the case is that the date of distribution occurred both after the hus-
band's death and the executor's sale. Brewster held that the decree of
distribution gives no new rights and should not be considered in deter-
mining basis. By concentrating on the status of the plaintiff as executor of
the wife's estate at the time of sale and on the date of distribution, the
majority in Manufacturers Hanover Trust put form before substance. 2
The result reached in Manufacturers Hanover Trust represents a trap
for the unwary. A long period of administration is not unusual, and the
conclusion reached by the majority would, mutatis mutandis, be equally
applicable to a shorter period of administration. The use of a single corpo-
rate executor for sucessive estates is not an unusual practice. The likelihood
of a corporate executor's serving successive estates has in fact, been greatly
increased in North Carolina due to the significant and continuing ex-
pansion of the state's larger banks, which now offer trust services that
were not available in the past. Executors should be aware when admin-
istering successive estates that utmost care should be taken in the choice
of dates for the distribution and sale of estate property.
LANNY B. BRIDGERS
Insurance-Liability of Insurers under the Omnibus Clause to
Protect Emergency Drivers-The North Carolina Situation
The general effect of an omnibus clause in an automobile liability
insurance policy is that one using the automobile with the permission of
the named insured becomes an additional insured under the policy.' Not
only does coverage under the omnibus clause provide the driver with a
right against the insurer for indemnification for liability arising out of
his use of the vehicle,2 but such coverage also guarantees at least minimal
recovery to an innocent third party who suffers personal injury or prop-
" The inequitable result reached by the majority is even more apparent upon
consideration of the estate-tax consequences. The fair market value of the securities
at the date of the husband's death was used to compute the estate tax on his estate.
27 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4354 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as APPLEMAN]; 7 D. BLASHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ &15.5,
.8 (3d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as BLASHEIELD].
27 APPLEMAN § 4354; 7 BLASIFIELD § 315.5. The liability of the insurer is
still controlled by the limits of coverage of the policy. 7 APPEMAN § 4371.
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